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STATE v. EV ANSi - A FRONTAL ATfACK ON THE 
COMMON LAW OF MURDER 
In Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court held the common 
law presumption of murder operating in homicide cases to 
be unconstitutional as a denial of due process. This article 
focuses on the seminal Ma1"yland case under Mullaney and 
surveys the effects of this and other Maryland decisions 
involving the presumption of murder. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It was but a matter of time before the common law's 
crazy quilt of murder and manslaughter - eight hundred 
years in the making and intricately interweaving Stuart 
modification of Tudor sUbstance with Victorian adaptation 
of Georgian procedure - would come under the cold glare 
of latter-day due process.2 
Until recently,3 homicide cases4 in Maryland were governed by 
the principle that once a killing had been proved by the prosecution 
and criminal agency shown, the killing was presumed to be murder 
in the second degree and the burden placed .upon the defendant to 
prove excuse or mitigation.5 The prosecution carried the burden 
of proving those elements which would raise the presumed crime 
of second degree murder to murder in the first degree.6 
In Mullaney v. Wilbur,7 a Maine case, the Supreme Court con-
fronted the question of the constitutionality of jury instructions 
in a homicide case which placed upon the defendant the burden to 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, heat of passion upon 
legally adequate provocation in order to reduce the presumed crime 
of murder to manslaughter.s The burden placed on the defendant 
by the jury instruction was held to violate due process of law be-
cause it unconstitutionally relieved the State of proving beyond a 
1. 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). 
2. Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 643-44, 349 A.2d 300, 306 (1975), aff'd, 278 
Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). 
3. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals filed its opinion in Evans v. State on 
November 25, 1975; the Maryland Court of Appeals filed its affirming decision in 
State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976), on July 15, 1976. 
4. In the context of this article, the term "homicide case" refers only to those cases 
involving a charge of murder in any degree. 
5. See, e.g., Chisley v. State, 202 Md. 87, 105, 95 A.2d 577, 585 (1953). 
6. !d. 
7. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
8. Id. at 686. The defendant claimed that he had killed his victim in hot blood 
upon being provoked by the latter's homosexual advances; the trial court in-
structed the jury that malice was to be conclusively implied and the defendant 
found guilty of murder unless the defendant prov~d, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that he had acted in the heat of passion. Id. at 685-86. 
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reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion on sudden provo-
cation. Under Maine law, absence of heat of passion was not an 
element of the crime charged, but rather a factor determining the 
degree of punishment. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that the 
State cannot constitutionally require a defendant to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence factors necessary to reduce the 
extent of punishment, since a failure to meet the burden would 
result in a substantially greater loss of liberty when it was Has 
likely as not" that the defendant deserved a lesser penalty. The 
Court stated: 
[T]he presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation ... has been, almost from the inception of the 
common law of homicide, the single most important factor 
in determining the degree of culpability attaching to an 
unlawful homicide.9 
Therefore, the defendant was unconstitutionally burdened with 
proving a factor critical to his criminal culpability. 
State v. Evanslo and its progeny represent Maryland's response 
to Mullaney.ll These cases place upon the State the burden of 
proving the absence of excuse, justification and mitigation beyond 
a reasonable doubt, whenever those defenses are in issue in a case. 
Although it has not yet been so held, dictum in Evans v. Statel2 
indicates that the burden of negating the presence of any affirma-
tive defense will henceforth be placed on the State.l3 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESUMPTION OF 
SECOND DEGREE MURDER 
The term "murder" has an ancient and curious history.u Fol-
lowing the Norman conquest of England, Normans were commonly 
slain by the conquered but vengeful Anglo-Saxons. In order to 
9. Id. at 696. 
10. 278 Md. 197,362 A.2d 629 (1976). 
11. Judge Moylan, writing for the court of special appeals in Evans 'lI. State, 28 
Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975), dealt extensively with the application of 
Mullaney to Maryland law. His opinion outlined the various jury instructions 
susceptible to attack under Mullaney and announced that the Mullaney holding 
was to encompass all affirmative defenses in both homicide and non-homicide 
cases. The comprehensive opinion, although largely dicta, laid the groundwork 
for subsequent opinions handed down by the court of special appeals. To date, 
the court of appeals has decided only three cases in the area - State v. Evans, 
278 Md. 197,362 A.2d 629 (1976); Garland v. State, 278 Md. 212, 362 A.2d 638 
(1976) ; and Dorsey v. State, 278 Md. 221, 362 A.2d 642 (1976). Because there 
has been little activity by the Maryland Court of Appeals in the area, this article 
will rely heavily on the decisions of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. 
12. 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). 
13. Id. at 713-15, 349 A.2d at 345-46. 
14. See R. MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 1-9 (1952) [hereinafter cited 
as R. MORELAND]; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 485-88 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND]. 
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curb the killings, the Norman King, William the Conqueror, im-
posed a heavy fine, a "murdrum," upon a local administrative unit, 
known as a "hundred," when any Norman was found slain.15 By 
the mid-fourteenth century, the Normans had become so much a 
part of the Anglo-Saxon culture that they were no longer looked 
upon as hated foreigners. The murdrum fine was thus no longer 
necessary to penalize the unwarranted killing of Normans, and 
the fine was abolished.16 The term "murdrum," however, lived on 
in the form of "murder," and came to signify the most culpable 
form of homicide.17 
Common law homicide was classified as justifiable, excusable 
or felonious.1s Justifiable homicide included the execution of a law-
ful death sentence and the slaying of an outlaw resisting capture.19 
Excusable homicide included killings that were accidental, prompted 
by self-defense or perpetrated by an infant or person of unsound 
mind.20 Although criminal, excusable homicide was deserving of 
a pardon from the king.21 The third class of homicide, felonious 
homicide, was divided into two main categories, murder and all 
other forms of homicide without justification or excuse.22 
Although the penalty for felonious homicide was death, anyone 
who could read was entitled to a commutation of the death sentence 
under the device known as "the benefit of clergy."23 Because of 
the obvious inadequacy of reading ability as the sole criterion for 
determining the degree of punishment, the benefit of clergy was 
abolished by a series of statutes24 for those homicides committed 
15. R. MORELAND, supra note 14, at 9; see 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra 
note 14, at 487. According to Bracton, the murdrum was originated by the 
Danish King Cnute to prevent Englishmen from secretly murdering his fellow 
Danes. William the Conqueror continued the practice to protect the Normans. 
Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REv. 974, 995 n.75 (1932) [hereinafter cited as 
Sayre]. 
16. R. MORELAND, supra note 14, at 9; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 
14, at 488. The statute which abolished the murdrum was 14 Edw. 3, St. 1, c.4 
(1340) . 
. 17. R. MORELAND, supra note 14, at 9. 
18. Id. at 9-10. 
19. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 14, at 478. 
20. R. MORELAND, supra note 14, at 478. 
21. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 14, at 479. "The Inan who commits 
homicide by misadventure or in self-defence deserves but needs a pardon." 
22. R MORELAND, supra note 14, at 9-10. 
23. A device originally designed to exempt clergymen from punishment for murder 
at the hands of the secular courts; eventually, the benefit was made available to 
anyone who could read. F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
ENGLAND 229-30 (1968). 
24. 12 Hen. 7, c.7 (1496); 4 Hen. 8, c.2 (1512); 23 Hen. 8, c.1, §§ 3-4 (1531); 1 
Edw. 6, c.12, § 10 (1547); Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 
43 YALE L.J. 537, 542 (1934) [hereinafter cited as PERKINS]. Benefit of clergy 
was not finaIly abolished from the criminal law of England until 1827 by the 
statute of 7 & 8 Geo.4, c.28, § 6 (1827). For a discussion of the ramifications 
of the abolition of the benefit, see 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1850, at 578 (1948). 
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with malice aforethought. The device was retained, however, for 
other types of felonious homicides.25 Thus, the presence or absence 
of malice aforethought became the criterion for distinguishing 
murder, or nonclergyable felonious homicide, punishable by death, 
from felonious homicide subject to the benefit of clergy, later termed 
manslaughter.26 The remaining development of common law mur-
der revolves in large part around the evolution of the various 
meanings of the term "malice aforethought." 
"Malice" originally possessed a meaning equivalent to "general 
malevolence or cold-blooded desire to injure,"27 and "aforethought" 
meant premeditation and deliberation.28 Today, the concept of 
malice aforethought contains little of its original meaning. Erosion 
of the concept involved three distinct stages: it began with the 
emergence of implied malice, continued with the abrogation of the 
requirement of premeditation and was completed with the wide-
spread use of inferences and presumptions of express malice. 
Express malice encompassed intent to kill and intent to do 
grievous bodily harm,29 whether or not death was intended. Both 
species of express malice demonstrated the general malevolence 
required to find malice under the earlier common law. Homicides 
occurred, however, in which death was the unintended result of 
an act not motivated by a desire to do serious injury but of such a 
grievous and evil nature as to warrant the same punishment as 
murder. For these acts, the law implied malice. When a person 
unintentionally: caused a death while resisting lawful arrest,SO or 
committing a felony,Sl or engaging in conduct in wanton disregard 
for the safety of others,82 malice was implied. 
The phrase "aforethought," which originally signified some-
thing in the nature of our present day premeditation and delibera-
tion, eventually became devoid of all meaning. Today, "afore-
thought" is a useless appendage to the word "malice."88 
The final step in the metamorphosis of "malice aforethought" 
came with the widespread use of inferences and presumptions of 
express malice. The use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital 
part of the body gave rise to an inference, or sometimes a presump-
25. Sayre, supra note 15, at 996-97. 
26. Manslaughter, the lesser degree of felonious homicide, was also termed "chance 
medley" and was punishable by a year's imprisonment and a branding of the 
thumb. Perkins, supra note 24, at 544 & n.63. 
27. Sayre, supra note IS, at 997. 
28. Perkins, supra note 24, at 545. 
29. I d. at 548-49. 
30. R. MORELAND, supra note 14, at 13-14. 
31. ld. at 14. 
32. ld. at 14-15. 
33. Purver, The Language of Murder,14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1306, 1309 (1967). 
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tion, of malice.84 Eventually, malice was presumed· upon a showing 
that a killing had occurred and that the accused was,tJl~ homicidal 
agent. Instead of requiring the prosecution to prove malice as an 
element of the crime of murder, the burden was placed on the de-
fendant to prove circumstances of mitigation, excuse or justifica-
tion:85 Blackstone stated the rule as follows: 
[W] e may take it for a general rule that all homicide is 
malicious, and of course amounts to murder, unless where 
justified by command or permission of the law, excused on 
the account of accident or self preservation, or alleviated 
into manslaughter •..• All these circumstances of justifi-
cation, excuse or alleviation, it is incumbent upon the 
prisoner to make out, to the satisfaction of the court and 
jury .•.. For all homicide is presumed to be malicious until 
the contrary appeareth upon evidence.86 
It is precisely this rule, outlined by Blackstone and imported into 
the common law of Maryland, which has now been declared viola-
tive of due process of law.s7 
III. THE EVANS CASE 
Testimony at the trial of Edward Evans for. the murder of 
Alonzo Counts established that Evans met Counts early on the 
day of the homicide and demanded payment of a debt. The de-
ceased refused payment and a fight ensued, resulting in Evans' 
loss of the contest and hasty retreat.ss Later that day, during a 
subsequent encounter, Evans stabbed and killed Alonzo Counts. 
Eyewitness testimony indicated that the deceased was the ag-
gressor in the second confrontation and that he had advanced upon 
Evans while swinging a metal pipe.89 The evidence was sufficient 
to support either a finding that the defendant had acted in hot-
blooded response to legally adequate provocation or that he had 
acted in self-defense.4o 
The following jury instructions were given by· the court and 
challenged for the first time on appeal: 
'The Defendant has the burden of showing the elements 
which would reduce the crime to manslaughter .•. .'41 
34. See R. MORELAND, supra note 14, at 21. 
35. ld. at 11-12,21-24. 
36. ]. EHRLICH, EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE 845 (1959). 
37. State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197,362 A.2d 629 (1976). 
38. Brief for Appellee at 3-4, 6-7, State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). 
39. ld. at 4. 
40. State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 199,362 A.2d 629, 630-31 (1976). 
41. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 
300 (1975). 
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'The Defendant has the burden of showing elements which 
would ••• make the homicide justifiable and excusable.'42 
'The use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the 
body gives rise to the presumption that malice existed. 
Since malice can be inferred from the act of directing a 
deadly weapon at a vital part of the body, the State was 
required to show nothing more to present a jury question 
as to murder in the second degree.'4a 
On appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, the defendant 
contended that these jury instructions unconstitutionally relieved 
the State of its burden to prove every element of the crime of 
murder beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of the principle 
set forth in In re Winskip,44 as applied in Mullaney.41S 
The defendant advanced two specific contentions with respect 
to the instructions :46 (1) the instructions which allowed a pre-
sumption or inference of malice from the use of a deadly weapon 
directed at a vital part of the body unconstitutionally relieved the 
42. Brief for Appellee at 31, State v. Evans,278 Md. 197, 362 A2d 629 (1976). 
43. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A2d 300 
(1975) (record references omitted). 
44. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In re Winship was the first Supreme Court decision "ex-
plicitly [holding] that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against con-
viction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged." !d. at 364. 
45. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Evans v. State, 28 Mel. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 
(1975). 
46. Before considering these contentions, the court was forced to face the "prelimi-
nary hurdle of plain error." Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 650,349 A.2d 300, 
309 (1975). The general rule is that a party assigning error in jury instructions 
may not do so as of right unless the party lodged the objection at trial. Ordi-
narily, the failure to make objection will preclude review of the instruction on 
appeal. Parker v. State, 4 Md. App. 62, 66-67, 241 A.2d 185, 187-88 (1968); 
Hicks v. State, 3 Md. App. 225, 231, 238 A.2d 577, 580 (1968). However, the 
courts are permitted to "take cognizance of and correct any plain error in in-
structions, material to the rights of the accused even though such error was not 
objected to •••• " Md. Rule 756(g). Noting that the jury instructions contained 
irremediable errors of commission material to the rights of the accused and 
that the defendant and his attorney could not have anticipated Mullaney and 
its effect on Maryland law, the court of special appeals deemed a prompt review 
of the case necessary. 28 Md. App. at 650, 349 A2d at 309. 
Prior to deciding the merits of the case, the court also dealt with the retro-
active application of Mullaney. Although Evans' trial took place prior to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney, the court accorded the Mullaney decision 
full retroactive effect because of its reliance on Winship, which itself had been 
applied retroactively. Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 651-54, 349 A.2d 300, 
310-12 (1975) ; Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 204-05 (1972). 
However, it is especially important to note that the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals in Squire v. State, 32 Md. App. 307, 309-10, 360 A.2d 443, 
444-45 (1976), declined review of jury instructions, to which no objection at 
trial was entered. The court reasoned that defendants, whose court proceedings 
occurred subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney, were on 
notice of that decision. The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari in 
Squire on October 27, 1976, Docket No. 113. 
1976] Presumption of Murder 101 
State of its burden of proving the element of malice beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and (2) the instructions which placed the burden 
upon the defendant to show circumstances which would reduce the 
presumed crime of second degree murder to manslaughter and the 
instruction which placed the burden upon the defendant to prove 
self-defense, unconstitutionally shifted the burden of persuasion 
from the State to the defendant.47 
The court accepted the defendant's first contention.48 In an 
attempt to clarify the meaning of the nebulous term "malice," the 
court held that malice encompassed three distinct components: 
"1) the intention of doing a particular act; 2) the absence of 
justification or excuse; and 3) the absence of mitigating circum-
stances."49 Although an inference of the "intent" component of 
malice is proper from the use of deadly force, an inference of malice 
was held constitutional error, since the use of deadly force does not 
negate the presence of excuse, justification or mitigating circum-
stances.50 
In the instructions burdening the defendant with proof of 
mitigation and self-defense, the court found reversible constitu-
tional error.51 The State must prove lack of mitigation and absence 
of excuse beyond a reasonable doubt since both are components of 
malice, an essential element of the crime charged. The presumption 
embodied in the instructions imposing on the defendant the burden 
of showing mitigation or excuse was held to violate due process 
because it relieved the State of its burden of proving every element 
of the offense as required by In re Winship.52 
The court limited its holding to instances in which mitigation, 
justification or excuse had been put in issue: 
When a defendant has then no right even to take an issue 
before the jury, any instruction on such an issue (errone-
ous or not) is more than he is entitled to. When any con-
sideration of an issue by the fact finder (court or jury) 
would properly be totally foreclosed, the defendant cannot 
complain that the issue was submitted under an unduly 
heavy burden upon him, since he has, even in that event, 
received more than he deserved. To carry an undue burden 
of persuasion may be a critical handicap to one legitimately 
in a race; it is no handicap at all when one is not entitled 
to run in the race. 53 
47. Brief for Appellee at 28-34, State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). 
48. Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 662--{j3, 349 A.2d 300, 316-17 (1975). 
49. I d. at 705, 349 A.2d at 340. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 730-31, 349 A2d at 354. 
52. Id. at 662, 349 A.2d at 316-17. 
53. ld. at 668, 349 A.2d at 319. 
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Therefore, before an erroneous allocation of the burden of per-
suasion on excuse, justification or mitigation is reversible error, 
the evidence presented must raise an issue with respect to one of 
those defenses.1I4 To this limited extent, then, the defendant must 
work under an adverse presumption :511 the defendant has the bur-
den to produce evidence sufficient to generate an issue of excuse, 
justification or mitigation or must rely upon evidence produced 
by the State.' Once the burden of production has been met, the 
presumption disappearS and the jury receives the issue with an 
instruction that the burden of proof is on the State. The jury has 
no need to know that such a burden ever existed. If the evidence 
fails to generate an issue, there should be no instruction at all with 
respect to that issue.56 However, if the court gives an instruction 
in this regard, the erroneous instruction will be held harmless. 57 
Therefore, the defendant bears only "the risk of non-production."58 
The conclusion of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals was 
that Mullaney "dooms as unconstitutional any procedural device 
which 1) imposes upon a defendant a burden of proving, by any 
standard, his innocence as to any element of a crime or 2) relieves 
the State of its burden of ultimate persuasion beyond a reasonable 
doubt' as to any issue fairly in the case."59 
. In affirming the court of special appeals,60 the Maryland Court 
of Appeals endorsed the broad interpretation given Mullaney. Not-
ing that Mullaney dealt only with jury instructions on the allocation 
of the burden of proof on the limited defense of heat of passion 
upon adequate provocation, the court quoted with approval the 
54. !d. at 665-69, 349 A.2d at 31&-20. 
55. The court divided true presumptions into two types: (1) a presumption in the 
Morgan tradition, which stands until sufficient evidence is produced, by the party 
laboring under the presumption, to rebut it, thereby shifting the burden of per-
suasion on the issue, and (2) a presumption in the Thayer-Wigmore tradition, 
which places upon the party burdened with the presumption the obligation of 
,pr'oducing sufficient evidence contrary to the fact presumed to raise an issue in 
the case; once this burden has been met the presumption totally disappears. It is 
"this latter form of presumption with which a defendant in a homicide case may 
be properly said to be burdened in respect. to mitigation, excuse or justifica-
tion. Evans v; State, 28 Md. App. 640, 706-13, 349 A.2d 300, 341-45 (1975). 
See Morgan, Presumpti01u, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255 (1937); J. THAYER, A 
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (1898); 4 J. WIG-
MORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 2491 (1st ed. 1905). 
56. Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 722-23, 729-30, 349 A.2d 300, 350, 354-55 
(1975). 
57. Id. at 665-69, 349 A.2d at 31&-20. 
58. Id. at 669, 349 A.2d at 320. 
59. Id. at 654, 349 A.2d at 312. 
60. The court of appeals approved the retroactive application of Mullaney and held 
that a finding of "plain error" under Maryland Rule 756(g) did not represent an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 210-12, 362 A.2d 629, 637-38 
(1976). 
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court of special appeals' opinion with respect to the scope of 
Mullaney: 
' ... that what is involved is the broader question of the 
allocation of the burden of persuasion where a wrongful 
allocation of that burden will operate to relieve the State 
of its obligation under the Due Process Clause, as inter-
preted by Winship, to prove each and every element of a 
criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. This goes 
beyond the limited defense of mitigation and it goes beyond 
the limited confines of jury instructions.'61 
The Evans decision lays to rest the common law presumption of 
second degree murder arising from the mere fact of homicide and 
a showing of criminal agency which had previously permeated 
Maryland homicide law. 
IV. EFFECTS OF EVANS 
A survey of subsequent decisions employing the Evans rationale 
illustrates the extensive impact of the case upon Maryland 
criminal law. Cases assigning Evans-type error may be divided 
into five categories: 
1) Decisions involving mitigation when the issue was presented 
and the verdict was for second degree murder; 
2) Decisions involving excuse or justification, when either 
issue was presented and the verdict was for any degree of felonious 
homicide; 
3) Decisions involving mitigation when the issue was presented 
and the verdict was for manslaughter or murder in the first degree; 
4) Decisions involving mitigation, justification or excuse, when 
such questions were not issues ;62 
5) Decisions involving an erroneous allocation of burdens of 
proof in non-homicide cases. 
A. Mitigation in Issue and Verdict for Second Degree Murder 
In a case in which mitigation is an issue and a jury instruction 
is given that all homicide is presumed to be murder in the second 
degree or that the burden is on the accused to show mitigation to 
reduce the offense to manslaughter, and a verdict is returned for 
61. 278 Md. at 206, 362 A2d at 634. 
62. The foregoing categories are adapted from the court of special appeals' opinion 
in Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 654-69, 349 A.2d 300, at 312-20. 
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murder in the second degree, a reversal is required.63 A presumption 
of malice or an instruction placing the burden on the defendant to 
show mitigation allows the State to obtain a conviction without 
shouldering its burden of proving every element of the crime of 
murder.64 
Wentworth v. State65 and Shuck v. State,66 were homicide cases 
which, like Evans, involved evidence of mitigating circumstances. 
In both cases, convictions of second degree murder were reversed 
because jury instructions in each cast the burden upon the de-
fendant to prove mitigating circumstances. In cases of this nature 
the constitutional error and injury to the defendant are obvious; 
the presumption of malice relieves the State of its burden of prov-
ing that element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and thus 
enables the State to secure an easy conviction. 
Mitigation is not limited, however, to the Evans defense of 
heat of passion upon legally adequate provocation. In Wentworth, 
the defendant contended that she acted under duress or coercion 
in participating in the homicide. While noting that the defense 
of duress does not extend to the taking of another's life,67 the court 
of special appeals nevertheless held that the evidence produced a 
jury question of mitigation since an imperfect defense of duress 
may reduce murder to manslaughter.68 In Shuck, the court held 
that evidence of excessive force used in self-defense, while barring 
an issue on excuse or justification, did raise an issue with respect 
to the defense of mitigation by way of an imperfect defense of 
self-defense.69 
63. E.g., Wentworth v. State, 29 Md. App. 110, 349 A.2d 421 (1975); Shuck v. 
State, 29 Md. App. 33, 349 A.2d 378 (1975). 
64. The components common to both express and implied malice are an absence of 
excuse, justification and mitigating circumstances. The intent required in ex-
press malice is an intent to kill. An intent to do grievous bodily harm has 
variously been classified as express malice or implied malice. R. MORELAND, 
supra note 14, at 17-19. An intent to commit felony, to do an act in wanton 
disregard for the lives of others or to resist arrest, which felony or wanton act 
or resistance results in the death of a human being, constitutes implied malice. 
Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 697, 349 A.2d 200, 336 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 
197,362 A.2d 629 (1976). 
It is plain that mitigation may be an issue in either the intent to kill type of 
malice or the intent to cause grievous bodily harm type of malice and an 
erroneous instruction may relieve the state of its burden. However, it is difficult 
to conceive of mitigating circumstances being present where a killing is com-
mitted during the course of a felony, during the performance of an act in 
wanton disregard for the lives of others or while resisting arrest. Thus, an 
erroneous allocation of the burden of proof on the issue of mitigation will most 
frequently affect murder convictions based on the former two types of malice. 
65. 29 Md. App. 110,349 A.2d 421 (1975). 
66. 29 Md. App. 33, 349 A.2d 378 (1975). 
67. 29 Md. App. 110, 118-19,349 A.2d 421,426-27 (1975). 
68. ld. at 119-21, 349 A.2d at 427-28. 
69. 29 Md. App. 33, 41-43,349 A.2d 378, 383-84 (1975). 
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Although Mullaney errors most frequently will be detected in 
jury trials, the rationale of Mullaney and State v. Evans applies 
with equal force to court trials.70 In Law v. State,71 a verdict of 
second degree murder rendered by the court was reversed because 
the judge, in the course of his opinion, referred to a presumption 
of malice and his belief that the burden was on the defendant to 
prove mitigation. This reliance on the now unconstitutional pre-
sumption of malice required the verdict to be reversed.72 
State v. Garland,78 a companion case in the court of appeals 
to State v. Evans, makes clear that the Evans doctrine is not with-
out limitations. Mitigation was an issue in the Garland trial which 
ended in a second degree murder conviction. The jury was in-
structed that "in dealing with murder, the presumption is that it is 
murder in the second degree."74 The court of special appeals held 
that the instruction was technically correct because all murder is 
presumed to be the lesser degree of murder, that is, second degree 
murder, until the State proves circumstances raising the crime to 
murder in the first degree. However, the court held that in this 
context, the instruction was a careless way of phrasing the more 
common instruction that" , all homicide is presumed to be murder 
in the second degree.' "75 The possibility that the jury may have so 
understood the instruction was enough to constitute reversible 
error.76 Moreover, the court indicated that a jury instruction on 
the components of malice which neglected to include the absence 
of mitigating circumstances also constituted reversible error.77 
In reversing, the court of appeals held that jury instructions 
which contained a correct statement of the law, whether or not the 
result of a trial judge's carelessness, could not provide a basis for 
reversing a conviction.78 The court further held that the failure 
of the instruction to include absence of mitigation as a component 
of malice did not constitute reversible error in this specific situa-
70. Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 663-65, 349 A.2d 300, 317 (1975) (dictum): 
"It is, of course, the ultimate fact of allocation and not merely the means of 
the allocation which is critical on the question of due process of law." /d. at 
662 n.6, 349 A.2d 317 n.6. 
71. 29 Md. App. 457, 349 A.2d at 295 (1975). 
72. ld. at 460-66, 349 A.2d at 297-300. Law was decided before the court of appeals 
rendered its decision in State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976), the 
holding of which applied explicitly to jury trials. Law has neither been affirmed 
nor reversed by the court of appeals. 
73. 278 Md. 212, 362 A.2d 638 (1976). 
74. !d. at 215,362 A.2d at 639 (emphasis supplied). 
75. Garland v. State, 29 Md. App. 27, 30, 349 A.2d 374, 376 (1975) (emphasis. 
supplied) . 
76. ld. 
77. ld. at 32, 349 A.2d at 377. 
78. State v. Garland, 278 Md. 212, 218-20, 362 A.2d 638, 641-42 (1976). 
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tion.79 The jury had 'Qeen advised twice that the burden is on the 
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
thus informing the jury that the burden to prove innocence never 
shifts to the defendant. The jury was also instructed that if it 
found circumstances of mitigation, the crime would be man-
slaughter. In the context of the overall charge, therefore, the court 
held that the instructions did not unconstitutionally relieve the 
State of its burden to prove a critical component of malice. so In 
reviewing instructions for Mullaney ,errors, the court of ,appeals 
stated, "attention should not be focused on a particular portion 
lifted out of context, but rather their adequacy must be determined 
by viewing them as an entirety."s1 
B. Excuse or Justification in Issue and Verdict for Any Degree 
of Felonious Homicide 
Proof of justificatjon or excuse renders a homicide defendant 
-entirely blameless rather than guilty to a lesser degree, as does 
proof of mitigation.s2 , An instruction requiring a defendant to 
prove excuse or justification or one relying on a presumption of 
murder from the fact of homicide constitutes irreparable injury to 
a defendant who has presented evidence with respect to excuse or 
justification.s3 Such evidence may raise a reasonable doubt whether 
the killing was unjustified and unexcused yet be insufficient to 
prove excuse or justification by a preponderance of the evidence or 
to overcome the presumption of second degree murder. Under such 
an instruction, then, the State could obtain a conviction when a 
reasonable doubt still existed as to guilt. Today, in order to obtain 
a conviction for any degree of felonious homicide, the State must 
79. !d. at 219-20, 362 A.2d at 642. 
SO. ld. 
8!. ld. at 220, 362 A2d at 642. 
82. Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 664, 349 A.2d 300,317 (1975). 
83. Stambaugh v. State, 30 Md. App. 707, 353 A.2d 638 (1976) (second degree mur-
der); Law v. State, 29 Md. App. 457, 349 A2d 295 (1975) (second degree 
murder and assault with intent to murder); Wright v. State, 29 Md. App. 57, 
349 A.2d 391 (1975) (manslaughter); see Milhouse v. State, 31 Md. App. 571, 
358 A.2d 262 (1976) (second degree murder) (dictum). But cf. Newkirk v. 
State, 32 MeL App. 621, 363 A.2d 637 (1976), in which the defendant claimed the 
killing was accidental but was convicted of first degree murder. The court of 
special appeals held that the jury "did not rely upon the erroneous instruction pre-
suming all felonious homicides to constitute second degree murder; instead it con-
cluded that the State had sustained the burden properly placed upon it by the 
instructions of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the killing was willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated and hence not unintentional or accidental ..•• " 32 
MeL App. at 628, 363 A.2d at 641. 
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prove beyond a reasonable doubt -the absence of justification or 
excuse, when either is an issue in the case.84 
In Wright v. State,85 evidence of self':defense was:produced by 
the defendant and the jury was instructed that the defendant had 
the burden to prove such self-defense bya preponderance of the 
evidence. The defendant was convicted of voluritary manslaughter. 
The coUrt of special appeals held that since self-defense would 
relieve a defendant of guilt for manslaughter, tlie allocation of the 
burden of proof to the defendant on the issue of self-defense was 
reversible error.86 ' , 
Law v. State81 and Stambaugh v. State88 involved the issue of 
whether a death was an accidental 'homicide. In Law, a court trial 
resulting in a verdict of second degree murder, the trial judge 
indicated that he had placed the burden of proving 'accidental 
homicide upon the defendant.89 In Stambaugh, which also resulted 
in a second degree murder conviction, jury instructions provided 
that all homicide was' presumed to be murder in the second degree 
and that the burden was on the defendant to prove excuse or justi-
fication.90 The convictions in both cases were reversed because the 
erroneous allocation of the burden of proof in each allowed the 
State to obtain a conviction when the verdict might have been 
"not guilty" if the State had properly been required to prove the 
absence of accidental homicide. 
C. Mitigation in Issue and l'erdict for MansT.aughter or First 
, Degree Murder 
When the evidence generates an issue of mitigation and there 
is an erroneous allocation of the burden of proof with respect 
thereto, a verdict of manslaughter cures the error and reversal is 
not required.91 The accused will be put to the unconstitutional task 
of proving that he acted under mitigating circumstances. When he 
shoulders that burden successfully, however, the, error in the in-
struction is cured, since the defendant has "received everything 
84. Law v. State, 29 Md. App. 457, 466, 349 A.2d 295, 300 (1975). The court of 
special appeals had held even before its decision in Evans. that when there is 
evidence tending to show that the killing was ,accidental, the burden of proof is 
on the State to show beyond a reasonable doubt that it was intentional. 
Wilson v. State, 28 Md. App. 168, 178, 343 A2d 537, 542 (1975). Although 
Wilson was decided after Mullaney, it did not mention Mullaney. 
85. 29 Md. App. 57, 349 A.2d 391 (1975). ' -
86. ld. at 61, 349 A2d at 393. 
87. 29 Md. App. 457, 349A2d 295 (1975). 
88. 30 Md. App. 707, 353 A2d 638 (1976). 
89. 29 Md. App. 457, 465, 349 A.2d 295,300 (1975). 
90. 30 Md. App. 707, 710, 353 A.2d 638, 640 (1976)., -
91. Wright v. State, 29 Md. App. 57, 60-61, 349 A.2d 391, 393 (1975).-
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for which he was contending and to which he may arguably have 
been entitled."92 
In Wright 'V. State,93 the court of special appeals reviewed jury 
instructions that placed an affirmative burden on the defendant to 
prove mitigating circumstances and self-defense. A verdict for 
manslaughter was returned. Although the conviction was reversed 
because of an erroneous allocation of the burden of proof with 
respect to self-defen!;e,94 the court indicated that had mitigation 
been the only issue generated by the evidence, the erroneous instruc-
tion would have been harmless.95 
When an issue of mitigation is present and there is an erroneous 
allocation of the burden of proof with respect thereto, a verdict of 
murder in the first degree (based on proof of wilfulness, delibera-
tion and premeditation) will cure the error and reversal is not 
required.96 In Maryland, it is well settled that a first degree murder 
conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing 
was wilful, deliberate and premeditated.91 A first degree murder 
conviction based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of these 
three elements necessarily negates beyond a reasonable doubt the 
presence of mitigating circumstances. os The impossibility of miti-
gating circumstances' coexisting with the elements of wilfulness, 
deliberation and premeditation is demonstrated by the definition 
of these elements under Maryland law: 
"Premeditated". means that the killing must have been 
meditated, planned in the mind, beforehand; that the design 
to kill must have preceded the killing by an appreciable 
length of time, time enough to deliberate; and in order to 
justify a conviction of first degree murder, the trier of facts 
must find the actual intent (wilfulness), the fully formed 
purpose to kill (deliberation), with enough time for de-
liberation and premeditation to convince the trier of facts 
that this purpose is not the immediate offspring of rash-
ness and impetuous temper (lack of deliberation and pre-
92. Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 655, 349 A.2d 300, 312 (1975), ajJ'd, 278 Md. 
197,362 A.2d 629 (1976). 
93. 29 Md. App. 57, 349 A.2d 391 (1975). 
94. !d. at 61, 349 A.2d at 393. See section IV, B, supra, for an explanation of the 
reversal. 
95. 29 Md. App. 57, 60-61, 349 A.2d 391, 393 (1975). 
96. E.g., Wilkins v. State, 402 F. Supp. 76 (D. Md. 1975); Dorsey v. State, 278 
Md. 221, 362 A.2d 642 (1976); Edwards v. State, 31 Md. App. 562, 358 
A.2d 590 (1976); Glazier v. State, 30 Md. App. 647, 353 A.2d 674 (1976) 
(semble); Brown v. State, 29 Md. App. 1, 349 A.2d 359 (1975) (semble). 
97. E.g., Chisley v. State, 202 Md. 87, 105, 95 A.2d 577, 585 (1953). 
98. Dorsey v. State, 278 Md. 221, 362 A.2d 642 (1976); see also Evans v. State, 
28 Md. App. 640, 658, 349 A.2d 300, 314 (1975), ajJ'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 
629 (1976). ' 
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meditation), but that the mind has become fully conscious 
of its own design.99 
109 
A first degree murder verdict cures an erroneous allocation of 
the burden of proof on the issue of mitigation, if the court has 
accurately apprised the jury of the State's burden of proving wilful-
ness, deliberation and premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. 
D. Mitigation, Justification or Excuse Not in Issue 
If excuse, justification and mitigation are not at issue, and the 
jury is instructed that all homicide is presumed to be murder in the 
second degree, or that the burden is on the accused to prove excuse, 
justification or mitigation, the instruction, though erroneous, will 
not require reversal.lOO 
When a defendant has •.. no right even to take an issue 
before the jury, any instruction on such an issue (erroneous 
or not) is more than he is entitled to.IOl 
In Brown v. State,102 the court of special appeals reviewed 
similar circumstances with respect to mitigation and concluded: 
The net result, in such cases, of incorrect instruction 
where mitigation or "hot blood" is not an issue fairly in 
the case, is that the instruction, at worse, is harmless error 
beyond a reasonable doubt ... and at best, a gratuity given 
for the benefit of the accused and to which he was un-
entitled.lo3 
An erroneous allocation of the burden of persuasion on the question 
of self-defense was held to be harmless in Thomas v. Statel04 since 
the evidence did not present a jury question on self-defense. 
In Newborn v. State,l°5 the defendant admitted that neither the 
State's evidence nor the defendant's evidence generated a fair jury 
issue with respect to justification, excuse or mitigation. The de-
99. Hyde v. State, 228 Md. 209, 215,179 A.2d 421,424 (1962). 
100. E.g., McDowell v. State, 31 Md. App. 652, 358 A.2d 624 (1976) (semble); 
Glazier v. State, 30 Md. App. 647, 353 A.2d 674 (1976) (semble) j Warren v. 
State, 29 Md. App. 560, 350 A2d 173 (1976); Blake v. State, 29 Md. App. 124, 
349 A.2d 429 (1975); Newborn v. State, 29 Md. App. 85, 349 A.2d 407 (1975) ; 
Thomas v. State, 29 Md. App. 45, 349 A2d 384 (1975); Burko v. State, 28 Md. 
App. 732, 349 A.2d 355 (1975). 
101. Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 668, 349 A2d 300, 319 (1975) (dictum), a/J'd, 
278 Md. 197, 362 A2d 639 (1976). 
102. 29 Md. App. 1,349 A2d 359 (1975). 
103. ld. at 19-20, 349 A2d at 370-71. Brown was decided partly upon the curative 
effect of a conviction of first degree murder when erroneous instructions had been 
given on the burden of proving mitigation. 
104. 29 Md. App. 45, 349 A.2d 384 (1975). 
105. 29 Md. App. 85, 349 A2d 407 (1975). 
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fendant, however, contended that a reference made by the assistant 
state's attorney to the crime of manslaughter in both his opening 
and closing statement was sufficient to raise an issue of mitigation. 
Rejecting the defendant's argument, the court of special appeals 
held that "a fair jury question can only be generated by evidence 
and not be [sic] pleadings, courtroom allegations or arguments 
unsupported by evidence."lo6 
In Warren v. State,l°7 the defendant appealed a first degree 
murder conviction rendered under jury instructions that malice 
is presumed and that the defendant has the burden of proof on 
excuse, justification and mitigation. The killing had occurred dur-
ing the course of an attempted robbery and the first degree murder 
conviction had been obtained under Article 27, § 410 of the Mary-
land Code, providing in pertinent part: "murder which shall be 
committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any 
... robbery ... shall be murder in the first degree."lo8 The de-
fendant contended that the statute does not raise murder to the 
first degree until the State proves the elements of second degree 
murder, that is, an unlawful killing of a human being with malice, 
and that the presumption of malice unconstitutionally relieved the 
State of its burden of proof. Noting first that the underlying intent 
to commit the felony was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and 
that this proof supplied the intent component of malice,t°9 the court 
held that the absence of a genuine issue of mitigation, excuse or 
justification rendered the erroneous instruction immaterial.llo 
E. Non-homicide Cases 
In Maryland, an individual may not be convicted of assault 
with intent to murder unless the defendant would be guilty of 
murder if his victim had died.l11 Thus, a necessary element of the 
offense is the malicious state of mind required for a murder con-
106. ld. at 89, 349 A.2d at 410. 
107. 29 Md. App. 560, 350 A.2d 173 (1976). 
108. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 407 (1976) (emphasis supplied). Section 407 pro-
vides in full: 
All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in 
wait, or by any kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing shall be 
murder in the first degree. 
All murders committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an arson, 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 408 (1976), in the burning or attempted burning of a 
barn, stable, etc., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 409 (1976), or in the pe"rpetration or 
attempted perpetration of rape, sodomy," mayhem, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, 
storehouse breaking, daytime housebreaking or escape, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
§ 410 (1976), are murder in the first degree. " 
109. See note 64 supra. 
110. Warren v. State, 29 Md. App. 560, 567-68, 350 A.2d 173, 178-79 (1976). 
Ill. E.g., Tate v. State, 236 Md. 312, 317, 203 A.2d 882,884 (1964). 
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viction. Instructions are required on the elements of this state of 
mind, on the relevant defenses (justification, excuse or mitigation) 
and on the burdens of proof with respect thereto.1l2 Therefore, the 
Evans rationale applies to cases involving assault with intent to 
murder.113 
Several decisions indicate that the Evans rationale applies to 
cases involving the defense of alibi. ll4 In State v. Grady,115 the 
defendant was convicted of committing unnatural and perverted 
sex practices upon three young girls. The judge instructed the jury 
as follows with respect to the defendant's alibi defense: 
[I]n order to prove an alibi conclusively, the testimony 
must cover the whole time in which the crime by any possi-
bility might have been committed, and it should be sub-
jected to rigid scrutiny.ll6 
This instruction, the court held, could reasonably have been con':' 
strued by the jury as placing the burden on the defendant to prove 
the alibi defense conclusively. Because of the possibility of such 
an interpretation of the instruction, the conviction was reversed. 
The court held that the only purpose of alibi evidence, like any 
other defense evidence, was to erode the State's proof to a point 
where the jury could not find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
Beckette v. State,117 a similar case, the court concluded that there 
was no burden upon the defendant to prove his alibi. Alibi evidence, 
according to the court, should affect the case like any other de-
fense evidence, that is, it should be considered in conjunction with 
all of the evidence in determining whether or not a reasonable 
doubt as to guilt exists. us , 
Dinkins v. StateU9 and Horn v. State120 represent attempts to 
extend the Evans rationale to cases which involved permissive in-
ferences. Dinkins and Horn challenged the constitutionality of the 
widely used inference of theft from proof of the unexplained and 
exclusive possession of recently stolen goods. In considering the 
question whether the permissive inference operated in accord with 
due process, the court of special appeals in Dinkins pointed out 
that the inference did not shift an affirmative burden of proof to 
the defendant. Hence, the inference of theft did not come under 
112. Shuck v. State, 29 Md. App. 33, 36, 349 A.2d 378, 380 (1975). 
113. Id. 
114. State v. Grady, 276 Md. 178, 345 A.2d 436 (1975); Beckette v. State, 31 Md. 
App. 85, 355 A.2d 515 (1976). 
115. 276 Md. 178,345 A.2d 436 (1975). 
116. Id. at 181, 345 A.2d at 438. 
117. 31 Md. App. 85, 355 A.2d 515 (1976). 
118. Id. at 97-98, 355 A.2d at 523. 
119. 29 Md. App. 577, 349 A.2d 676, aj]'d mem., _ Md. __ , 362 A.2d 91 (1976). 
120. 29 Md. App. 23, 349 A2d 372 (1975). 
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the scrutiny of Evans in that regard. If the inference was unfair, 
however, that is, if there was no rational connection between the 
facts established and the fact inferred, the inference would operate 
to relieve the State of its burden to prove the fact of theft beyond 
a reasonable doubt.121 In examining the connection between the 
facts established and the fact inferred, the court emphasized that 
the inference of theft was only permitted upon a showing by the 
State that the possession of goods was both unexplained and ex-
clusive and that the goods had been recently stolen. The court 
found that proof of these circumstances was sufficient evidence 
upon which a rational juror could find the inferred fact of theft 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stressed that the jurors were 
not bound to make the inference, but instead were required to 
weigh all of the evidence to determine whether or not there was 
a reasonable doubt with respect to guilt. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that an instruction on the inference did not offend due 
process, and the conviction was affirmed.122 
Kathleen Howa1'd 
121. This conclusion of the court indicates that all permissive inferences are suspect to 
the extent that the inferred fact does not reasonably flow from the fact proved. 
Dinkins v. State, 29 Md. App. 577, 579-82, 349 A.2d 676, 678-80, af!'d mem., __ 
Md. __ , 362 A.2d 91 (1976). 
122. ld. at 580--83, 349 A.2d at 679-81. 
